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exhibiting the comparative numbers and losses of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia in the more important engagements of the last two years of the war:
| Federals. | Confederates. |
| Nos. | Loss. | Nos. | Loss. |
| Richmond—Seven Days | 105,000 | 30,000 | 80,000 | 19,543 |
| Second Manassas | 60,000 | 30,000 | 49,000 | 9,112 |
| Sharpsburg | 87,000 | 12,649 | 33,000 | 8,790 |
| Fredericksburg | 120,000 | 12,321 | 75,000 | 4,301 |
| Chancellorsville | 133,000 | 17,197 | 57,000 | 10,280 |
| Gettysburg | 101,000 | 24,000 | 59,000 | 19,000 |
| Wilderness | 140,000 | 60,000 | 64,000 | 18,000 |
| Surrender | 155,000 | | 7,800 |
These figures are monumental.
They constitute a monument to the Army of Northern Virginia as much superior to brass or stone as spirit is to matter or reason is to sense.
Yet, while these figures are conceded, their significance is met and their force evaded by an assumption that these soldiers lacked endurance and fortitude and a contrast is attempted to be drawn between their brilliant dash and the more steady and enduring valor of the
Northern troops.
If this charge—a lack of fortitude—could be sustained, it would detract much from the character of the
Southern soldier, for, as
Napoleon said: ‘The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation; courage is only the second.’
Let us submit this question to the test of admitted facts, and see if the charge be just.
Let us take the matter of equipment.
Let us compare that of
General McClellan before
Richmond with that of
General Johnston in the Summer of 1862.
The Prince de Joinville, who accompanied
McClellan, says that ‘But for the lack of women, their army might have been mistaken for an
armed emigration, rather than a march of soldiers,’ so thorough and elaborate was the equipment.
The Confederates, on the other hand, had soiled and
