How the fight began.
I had been in charge of the post at Staunton River bridge for about forty days prior to the engagement, preparing its defences and organizing and drilling the reserve forces.
On the 22d of June, receiving a telegram from
General Beauregard, at that time near
Petersburg, that a large raiding party of the enemy was out making its way towards the Danville railroad, I at once sent out couriers in every direction calling upon the citizens and all local organizations and soldiers at home ‘on leave’ to come forward and assist in completing the defences of this, the largest and most important bridge on the railroad, well knowing that if it was given up and destroyed,. from there to
Danville (as the
Federal forces succeeded in doing at every depot from
Burkeville to Staunton bridge) our wagon train would find it impossible to fill up the long gap until the railroad could be repaired or the rolling stock replaced, and that it would consequently be next to if not quite impossible for
General Lee to hold his pesition in front of
Richmond but a short time after such complete destruction of this road, then almost our only artery for supplies from the
South.
As evidence of my correct view of the situation at the time I refer you to an order issued by
General Lee almost immediately after this fight for the impressment and use of an extra large number of wagons, detailing all that could be spared from other portions of the army, under specially detached vigilant and expert quartermasters and commissaries, to cover this gap in the road from Staunton bridge to
Burkeville until it could be repaired.
The defences on both sides of the river, already well under way, were rendered as complete as the limited time after receiving
General Beauregard's order, up to the hour of the commencement of the fight, would permit, every position of which I directed and superintended myself, including the rifle-pits on the north and east sides of the
Staunton river.
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Your statement says
Colonel Coleman assumed command of the forces at the bridge and prepared the defences; on the contrary,
Colonel Coleman reported to me for service only a short time before the engagement actually began.
I then had two hundred and fifty men in position on the north and east side of the river, having placed them and fully directed them what to do, both in regard to improving their defences, as well as to reserve fire upon the enemy's approch until they could aim with deadly precision and at a close range.
This was all done before I had seen
Colonel Coleman, and well do I remember the words of gallant old
Mr. William Clarke, who remarked when I returned to the defences on the south side of the river that I seemed to be satisfied that we should hold the place against all odds, as I had by the disposition of our forces abandoned all idea of retreat and intended that it was to be victory, death or imprisonment, for, said he, ‘we are between the devil and the deep sea.’
After
Colonel Coleman reported to me I placed him in command of two hundred men besides those already on the east side of the river, placing twenty of the two hundred behind heavy timber, crossed so as to leave loopholes for them to fire through, in the form of an A over that end of the bridge, and it was at this point
the Rev. Mr. Burke was instantly killed by the explosion of a shell from the enemy's battery.
Colonel Coleman did his duty gallantly and efficiently, and in recognition of which I especially mentioned him in my report to
General Lee of the engagement, causing him to give
Colonel Coleman due consideration in his congratulatory order to my command.
It was I who sent the message to
Colonel Flournoy and many other prominent men throughout that and other adjacent counties, urging them to assemble all men who could bear arms, even temporarily, to assist in this defence.
Colonel Flournoy, as did
Hon. Paul Edmonds (then at home on leave, now member of Congress from that district), reported to me for any duty I might assign them to, and as each came mounted, and with a goodly number of followers likewise mounted, I sent one to the nearest ford above and the other to the nearest ford below the bridge, each some two miles away, to guard and prevent the enemy
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crossing to attack us in the rear.
While both of these gentlemen and their commands did most efficient service, neither of them were immediately present while the battle was being fought.
Your report of it, after giving
Colonel Coleman the credit of preparing the defences on the north and east side of the river and commanding those forces, says the rest of the command was held in reserve under
Colonel Flournoy on the right bank of the river.
This work was armed with four six-pounders, which were worked upon the enemy under the command of
Captain Marshall.
A gallant Virginian.
Colonel Flournoy was a gentleman
sans peur et sans reproche, and as he, by special invitation, on two occasions (once at his own house and once at the house of his neighbor,
Mr. Clarke), soon after this engagement met me and assisted in entertaining me as a compliment for ‘the most gallant defence,’ as he pleased to term it, ‘made of
Staunton river bridge, his home and household goods,’ I cannot think for a moment
Colonel Flournoy would have related to you that he was in command of the forces on either side of the river in this engagement, or that
Colonel Coleman would have claimed for himself what your report of this fight does—viz.: that he assumed command, constructed the defences and arranged the plan of battle on the left bank of the river.
Colonel Henry Eaton Coleman, I consider, was a man of high sense of honor and a chivalrous, gallant officer.
He was my friend.
After leaving your office in
Washington he came to see me in
Baltimore.
Knowing, as he did, my report to
General Lee, and
General Lee's complimentary reply to me and my command for the disposition of forces and the determination with which we made this fight,
Colonel Coleman could not have been my friend and written the friendly letter he did, had he believed me to have claimed any honors due to him.
Colonel R. E. Withers, commandant at
Danville at the time, knew all about the fight.
He most efficiently aided me with all the men at his command when I telegraphed him the situation, and the
Danville contingent constituted a great moral as well as material support, many of them being old soldiers.
I enclose a letter from
Colonel Withers, written not long after the battle, but after he had time to know all the facts from the officers of his command, who were engaged under my immediate supervision.
I also inclose
General R. E. Lee's letter to my command, showing a due appreciation of the gravity of the situation and the invaluable
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service rendered at the time by holding the position—the key to all our supplies—against such odds.
Your report says two hundred and fifty old men and boys made this fight against twenty-five hundred of the enemy.
This is a mistake: we still have enough credit left, and it may be correctly termed a remarkable victory, when, as I find by reference to my report, we had nine hundred anh thirty-eight men—of these only one hundred and fitty veterans, the remainder being the gallant reserves and citizens from adjacent counties, who deserve all the encomiums you have bestowed upon them.
In the management of these I was ably assisted by
Captain T. T. Boswell, of
Mecklenburg.
The enemy had six thousand well-trained and splendidly-equipped troops, over three thousand of whom advanced to the charge repeatedly on our small force, being as often disastrously repelled.
Another mistake.
Your description is in error in stating that ‘
General Wilson made his headquarters on
McPhail's lawn, from whence he could view the field of battle and all of its approaches.’
Really, neither Staunton bridge nor but few of its approaches can be seen from
McPhail's residence or lawn, which is (or was in 1864) obstructed from any extensive view by intervening woods.
I had the pleasure of knowing all of the family except
Major Mc-Phail, who was absent with his command at the front.
And I designedly had the empty trains frequently run back and forth between our defences and Clover depot, while the enemy were approaching and deploying, our men being instructed to huzza on the arrival of every train, thus giving plausibility to the report of
Mrs. McPhail to the
Federal commander, and giving him apparently good reason to believe we were rapidly being reinforced.
I do not think, General, that any of us deserve very great credit for doing our duty in what we believe to be right by both instruction and inheritance, but none of us are willing when having done our duty to have our work ascribed to others, and our children deprived of such honor and credit as our contemporaries and posterity think but just to award us.
I am, most respectfully,
