Interesting from Europe.
The arrest of the lieutenant of the C. S. steamer
Sumter and the
ex-Consul of the
United States, at
Tangiers, was made the subject of an interesting debate of the British Parliament on the 17th of March. It appears from the revelations of
Mr. Layard, that the arrest was a harsh and brutal proceeding, and that the prisoners were treated with great severity.
We append a sketch of the debate:
Arrest of Confederate States citizens in Morocco — the question in the British Parliament.
In the House of Commons, on Monday, March 17th,
Mr. D. Griffith asked the Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the
Lieutenant of the
Sumter and the
ex-Consul of the
United States, at
Cadiz, who were arrested on landing from the
Wille de Malaga steamer by the United States Consul at
Tangiers, were taken down to the harbor, and embarked as prisoners on board the U. S frigate
Ino; whether the
Moorish Government did not protest against this proceeding and only yielded to the threat of the United States Consul that he would strike his flag; and whether it was the opinion of her Majesty's Government that the jurisdiction with which, by the capitulations or treaties,
European consuls were invested over their countrymen in Mahomedan countries empowered them to make a judicial cognizance of alleged political offences commited in any other country; and, if not, whether the
British Government would take means to protect our faithful ally, the
Moorish Government from such infringement of its independence?
Mr. Layard said he owed an apology to his honorable friend and the
House for having on a previous occasion misinformed them on this subject.
In fact, it was only at the close of last week that he received the information which he was now about to give.
He had stated before that two gentlemen--one the purser of the so-called
Confederate States steamer
Sumter, and the other a gentlemen who was formerly United States Consul at
Cadiz — were proceeding on a voyage from
Cadiz to
Lisbon, and, according to
Mr. Myers, the purser's statement, hearing that a fellow-citizen was ill at
Tangiers, they landed to see him, and were returning to embark when they were met by the
American Consul, accompanied by Moorish guards, arrested on the spot and carried to the Consulate.
They were then loaded with irons and confined in an improper place.
The commander of the
Sumter, hearing what had occurred, wrote a letter to the
Moorish authorities, and sent it to
Mr. Hay, Her Majesty's Consul, requesting him to deliver it, and to make use of his influence on behalf of the prisoners.
Mr. Hay delivered the letter, but declined to take any steps in the way of interference.
That happened on the 19th.
On the 20th the
United States sloop
Ino arrived at
Tangiers; the
Captain landed with a number of his crew armed, and proceeded to the Consulate.
The Moorish Government, in the meantime, had learnt that these gentlemen had been arrested upon political accusations alone, and they sent a letter of remonstrance to the
Consul.
The Consul declined to surrender the prisoners, and fell back upon an article in the treaty between Morocco and the
United States.
The 11th article of a general treaty between Her Majesty and the Sultan of Morocco stated that should the
British Consul.
General or any British Consul,
Vice Consul or
Consular Agent, have at any time occasion to request from the
Moorish Government the assistance of soldiers, guards, or armed force, for the purpose of arresting any British subject, the demand should be complied with on payment of certain fees.
By the 23d article of the treaty between Morocco and the
United States, it was said that the
Consul of the
United States should reside at any seaport of the
Moorish dominions, and should enjoy all the privileges which the Consuls of any other nation enjoyed.
When it became known in
Tangiers that those gentlemen were about to be transferred to the sloop
Inc a large assemblege of Europeans and natives took place.
They threatened the United States Consul, and for some time a serious riot was apprehended.
The United States Consul sent for
Mr. Hay, but the declined to interfere, and at the same time remonstrated with the
Consul, who fell back on the treaty.
Mr. Hay pointed out that the right of affording asylum belonged to the
Moorish Government, and that the article of the treaty referred to really applied only to criminale, and not to persons charged with political offences.
The United States Consul declined to receive that interpretation of the treaty, and, on the remonstrance of the
Moorish authorities, he threatened not only to lower his flag, but to declare war against Morocco.
The authorities were so alarmed by this threat that they felt compelled to give the troops required, and the two gentlemen were marched down under the guard of those armed troops and of the seamen of the
United States sloop, who were also armed, and put on board the
Ino. Her Majesty's Government believed that
Mr. Hay took a right view of his duty throughout, and approved his conduct.
[Hear, hear]
In reply to a question put by my honorable friend the other night, I stated that they had been released, but that mistake was owing to a dispatch which had been received at the Foreign Office from Lord Cowley, announcing that circumstance.
Not bearing any such intelligence from other sources, the Foreign Office applied for information again, and Lord Cowley stated in reply that
M. Thonvanel had received a similar dispatch.
The War Office then telegraphed to her Majesty's Minister at
Madrid, but got an answer that he had got no official intelligence, whether they had been released or not.--Upon that the War Office telegraphed to
sir W. Codrington, the
Governor on
Gibraltar, and it was not until late on Friday night that his answer was received — too late for communication to the honorable gentleman.--That answer states that the gentlemen arrested were carried off to the
United States He (
Mr. Layard) trusted that the
House would acquit him of any intention to deceive them.
[Hear, hear.] The facts required no comment [Hear, hear.] For the sake of justice, of humanity, of the right of affording asylum to persons accused of political offences — a claim preferred by the weakes, and recognized by the strongest powers — he might be permitted to express an earnest hope that when the circumstances came to the knowledge of the
President of the
United States, he would order the release of the prisoners.
[Hear, hear]
The order of the day was then read for the resumption of the adjourned debate on the motion--,"That the present state of international maritime law, as affecting the rights.
of belligerents and neutrals, is still undefined and unsatisfactory, and calls for the early attention of her Majesty's Government."
Tar Impossibilities of the American War.
[From the London, Times, March 18.]
All the intelligence and all the opinions from
America bring out into strong relief the existence of very great power and very great spirit on both sides of the conflict.
After the
Federal reverses of last year we heard of nothing but the unshaken resolution and unwearying energy of the
North, which only wanted a little more training and discipline to do all it desired.
The recent Confederate reverses have the very same effect in sending us renewed assurance of the
Southern determination to continue resistance through all its possible phases down to the guerrilla warfare of
Spain and
Mexico, even though, as in the latter case, there should ensue an intermitable anarchy.
At this distance it is useless to discuss the expected operations, which before this will have been commenced with more or less effect.
It is probably decided by this time whether
General McClellan could turn the left of the Confederate forces, and, by reinforeign
Generals Lanks and
Stone, get to the rear of the enemy and obtain poisession of
Richmond.
A third victory in
Tennessee will have secured the
Western half of that State to the
Federal side, or a defeat will have rendered fruitless all the blood shed at
Forts Henry and Denelson, The superiority of the
North in numbers, in wealth, and in the means of locomotion, makes it probable that they have followed up their victory, and established themselves as thoroughly on the west of the chief seceding States as they have, by means of their fleets, on the east and south.
But, on the most favorable supposition for the
Federal cause, we have only arrived at the questions whether we do indeed see the beginning of the end, and what that and is likely to be. We see no anticipation or prophetic vision of that end in any of the communications from either side of the war.
The Federal talk only of present victory, and seem to look no further into the future.
The Confederate advocates talk of devastation and depopulation, of burning cities, destroying food, tearing up rails and reducing the country to a state of nature, of guerrilla warfare, and mutual extermination.
This is not looking to any end, but rather dwelling upon the horrid process of war, as if the spirit that had been roused found satisfaction more in the means than in the end.--The fearful anticipations are probably only too true.
The tone on both sides is that of bitter and insuiting defiance.
North and South real at one another much as the Homeric combatants did before the fatal interchange of spears.
But there is this unhappy difference — the post manages to dispose of one combatant, and to gives instant and entire effect to the menaces on at least one side of the duel.
In this case, the abuse, the threats, the defiances, the determination, threaten to be endless, and from both sides we gather the lamentable truth that, as far as eye can scan the
American horizon, there is nothing but war.
But when both sides see no conclusion of war except the exchange of one form of war for another, and a transition from order to disorder, from method to madness, it remain for the bystanders to speculate on the natural developments of the struggle.
To show that we are not exaggerating its chaotic tendencies, we need only refer to the very able letter of a correspondent, who undertakes to interpret the
Southern prospects and sympathies.
The amicable saparat on which some good people talk of the asserts to be neither possible nor desired.
The
North would not be content with less than all the border States, leaving to the
Confederates only the seven or eight original seceders.
But were this their object, they would still have to garrison
Virginia with an army out of all proportion to their resourtes, and, even so, they would feel the
Union at an end. They would find it impossible to get on without the trade of the
South; and slavery would thus be more recognized than ever, more obvious and more ferocious in quarrels.
Separation, then, he holds to be neither possible nor wished for, so long, at least, as the
North has any fight left in it. But whatever may be said of the difficulty of conquering the
Southern States, there can be no doubt of the
North to keep up the war in one way or another.
What, then, is the alternative to which we are to look, when conquest is impossible, when separation is impossible, when unfor, in the form we have seen it, is impossible, when success on either side is impossible, when peace is impossible, when war itself, as it is now carried on, is impossible,
when everything is impossible, except something that does not come under any of these heads, and that is beyond all present reasoning or reasonable expectation?
What is this but?
to avow that the Federation itself is impossible?
The principle has been tried and found wanting.
The Southern States will not submit to the worst of all bondages — a tyrant majority.
The Northern States can neither conquer, nor conciliate, nor win by any me had. Some appeal is to war, and the war, it is admitted on both sides, must work itself out to its legitimate results.
The question is no longers whether the
North will conquer the
South, but what the war will lead to, and what state of things will supervise upon the present.
The most far-seeing discover nothing in the prospect but guerrilla warfare, anarchy and devastation.
This is simply to omit that, the statesman having failed, the cause is now in the hands of the soldier.
But it is more; it is in the hands of the soldier who sees the dark end of federation instead of its bright; beginning.
This is not the age in which a French monarchy is breaking up or a republic is inaugurated, but in which a French empire has been restored and re-established.
It is an age in which strong monarchy is the fashionable cure for democratic disorder.
Europe has just congratulated
Italy on the acquisition which philosophers wanted for her, instead of the independent States which lately existed, instead of the theocracy which
Rome professes to give, instead of
Mazzini is republic.
The Western States of
Europe have at least the credit of offering.
Mexico a constitutional monarchy instead of a republican constitution, which has had no existence except in alternate anarchy and despotism.--This is an age of reaction, for which democracy has to thank itself.
The Dictator,
the Emperor or the
King is everywhere superceding the farces of the consul or the paper scheme of the law-giver.
When we are told that everything else is impossible in, America, and that politics are absorbed in the chance of war and the genius of the commanders, then, indeed, we see the beginning to the end. But that end is not the one desired by either North or South, nor even by us who look on. It cannot be for our interest that a military adventurer should possess the fairest regions of
North America, even though that were better than anarchy.
But it is the haven towards which the
American Commonwealth seems now drifting.
It is possible.
That is enough, when everything else is confessed to be impossible.
