Yankee plan of the Spring Campaign.
The New York
News has an article upon the coming — indeed, already commenced — campaign.
It is interesting as foreshadowing the expectations which the
North expects to be realized within the next few months.
The
News takes it for granted that
Johnston is retreating before
Sherman because of insufficient numbers to meet him in the field.
It says:
‘
After the evacuation of
Goldsboro',
Johnston retreated upon
Raleigh, forty-eight miles distant, and thence, we assume, upon
Hillsboro', forty miles more.
Greensboro', the junction of the new road leading south from
Danville, is forty-two miles from
Hillsboro' and fifty-four miles from
Danville.
If
Johnston is retreating upon this line, it is for the purpose of reaching
Danville, where he may possibly be expecting to receive aid from
Lee at
Richmond, one hundred and forty miles distant.
’
From
Raleigh, the Gaston railroad runs northeast a distance of eighty-five miles. At
Ridgeway, fifty-four miles from
Raleigh, it intersects the Roanoke Valley road, which sweeps in a curve from Hicksford junction, on the
Petersburg and
Weldon road, westward to
Clarkesville, a distance of twenty-two miles. This point is on the south bank of the
Roanoke, near the junction of the
Dan and
Staunton rivers, and but a short distance from
Boston, on the
Richmond and
Danville road, thirty-one miles above
Danville.
In order to cut
Johnston off, or reach the vicinity of the
Danville road as soon as he does,
General Sherman has to move from
Raleigh to
Clarkesville, when he will be twenty-two miles from Hicksford junction, the nearest point of railroad communication with
General Grant's left wing.
The distance from
Stony Creek station, on the
Petersburg and
Weldon road, which is within
General Grant's lines, to Hicksford junction, is only twenty-one miles, so that
Sherman's right and
Grant's left would only be forty-three miles, by rail, apart.
There are numerous indications that the grand battle-field will be, or has been found on the line of the
Roanoke river, near the junction of the
Dan and
Staunton, or further west, on the line of the
Dan, between
Clarkesville and
Boston, on the
Danville road.
By taking the line of the
Dan on which to give battle,
Lee would have
Sherman on the south bank, while
Grant's army would have a long distance to march overland in order to come up in
Lee's rear, or a long detour, should he seek to join
Sherman's right, and even then would find himself on the south bank of the river; for there are no railroads on the north bank of either the
Roanoke or Dan. So far as communications are concerned,
Sherman would have the best position, for he has the lines over which he has just traveled, and which could be kept open.
Johnston or
Lee, on the contrary, would find it difficult to keep their lines open unless the whole route to
Richmond was guarded, which would not be very probable.--Taking the situation of the country in this vicinity, and the object to be accomplished by
Lee — the possible defeat of
Sherman before he can be succored by
Grant — into consideration, it is reasonable to suppose that either the line of the
Roanoke, near
Clarkesville, or the line of the
Dan, to the westward of it, will be the scene of battle.
If
General Sherman pushes forward on the route above indicated, with a view to flank or intercept
Johnston ere he can reach
Danville or above, he may precipitate an engagement should
Johnston reach the line of the
Dan before him. In this case, we have no fears for the result, for
Sherman's army is too strong to fail before such a force as
Johnston has under his immediate command.
Any delay on the part of
Sherman now will result to the advantage of
Johnston, and enable him to take up a strong position, from which, when reinforced by
Lee, it will be difficult to dislodge him.
It is, doubtless, the intention of
Lee to secure possession of the
Richmond and
Danville road as long as possible, both from
Danville to
Burkesville and from
Richmond to this point.
Indeed, if he would save his army by withdrawing it into the interior of
Virginia, west of
Burkesville, he must do this, and preserve intact the road from
Richmond to
Burkesville, and thence to
Lynchburg;--
Johnston, by retreating slowly, and giving battle, so as to impede
Sherman's progress over the
Dan and
Staunton rivers, will materially aid his chief in this movement; and that is, probably, the intention.
The entire route is now valueless to
Lee. He cannot obtain from any State south of
Virginia one pound of provisions for his army, and is compelled to fall back upon his magazines in
Virginia for support during the continuance of the war. He has already commenced the transfer of valuable material to
Lynchburg, and, doubtless, has made that place of sufficient strength to enable it to be held for a length of time.
At
Lynchburg, he would be far in the interior of
Virginia, seventy-one miles from
Burkesville, upon the great line of the
Virginia and
Tennessee road, and in a position out of which he could not readily be flanked.
By falling back upon this point, he would lose
Richmond and
Petersburg, it is true, but he would save his army, and this is of more value to him than a constantly-menaced capital and depot of supplies.
