If you take the time to study the documentation from the 1950s & 1960s, the engineering culture of that era appears to be markedly different from the engineering culture prevalent today. And I think it's deeply rooted in the symbiotic relationship between computing, Baumol's cost disease and our obsession with precision, results-oriented, MBA-style-min-maxing, "good enough for government work" engineering.
Robert Truax, the designer of the Sea Dragon, loved to promote the design paradigm of Big Dumb Boosters. Instead of many small, sophisticated rocket engines, what if we made one big robust one that can take a lickin' and keep on kickin'.
The idea was to relax the mass margins and to create big. dumb. boosters. It's the approach TRW explicitly followed for the Lunar Module engine,
> "There was an amusing but instructive side to this program. TRW farmed-out the fabrication of the engine and its supporting structure, less the injector that they fabricated themselves, to a "job-shop" commercial steel fabricator located near their facility . The contract price was $ 8000. Two TRW executives visited the facility to observe the fabrication process. They found only one individual working on the hardware, and when queried, he did not know nor care that he was building an aerospace rocket engine."
> " I had arrived late to witness the test, and only saw the firing. I was told by others who witnessed the entire test procedure that the engine was pulled out of outdoor storage where it lay unprotected against the elements. Before it was placed on the launch stand, the test crew dusted off the desert sand that had clung to it. This unplanned inlcusion [sic] of a bit of an environmental test also demonstrated hardware ruggedness of the kind no other liquid rocket eingine [sic] could approach."
The Surveyor program managed to make it "just work" 5 out of 7 times by adopting this approach. It had robust landing legs and RADAR. They would decelerate and then shut off the engine 11' above the surface. The wide, sturdy legs would then absorb that final impact of coming stand still from free fall.
These programs had a lot of capital behind them. Some components required precision engineering, but there's a very clear through line and embrace of the "we gotta make stuff that can take a lickin' & keeps kickin'" philosophy.
Modern engineering approaches seem to be the opposite of that. I think we've become so accustomed to living in a silicon driven world where our personal devices are engineered at microscopic level that we've forgotten how to do things the Apollo-era way.
For example, to the best of my knowledge, IM-2 doesn't use RADAR — they're using LIDAR and optical navigation instead. Perhaps it is to save on mass and power so that more payload reaches the surface. Perhaps optical navigation was declared to be "good enough." Perhaps it doesn't make sense from a minmaxing of capital perspective. But this philosophy may not be suited to an untamed frontier.
China adopted the Surveyor / Apollo-era philosophy. Their first successful lander, Chang'e 3, used the same hover & fall technique as Surveyor.
> The vehicle will hover at this altitude, moving horizontally under its own guidance to avoid obstacles, and then slowly descend to 4 m above the ground, at which point its engine will shut down for a free-fall onto the lunar surface. The landing site will be at Sinus Iridum, at a latitude of 44º.
It chose the terminal landing sites with the help of LIDAR and its cameras, but it relied on RADAR and a suite of sensors to have robust navigation.
The follow up missions up-ed the ante every time, but they seem to have consistently focused on the robustness of their craft over precision, MBA-spreadsheet-oriented minmax-ing.
> "I think we've become so accustomed to living in a silicon driven world where our personal devices are engineered at microscopic level that we've forgotten how to do things the Apollo-era way."
This is a really interesting point. I think a practical issue in modern times as well is that companies are being inspired by SpaceX while forgetting that it took SpaceX alot of work to get to the point of being able to do things like casually land a 20 story tower in the middle of the ocean on a barge, let alone the even more ridiculous 'stunts' they're doing with Starship.
Apollo was starting from the perspective of trying to do something where it was even debatable about whether it was possible. And so I think there was a lot more 'humility' in design, for lack of a better word.
As they say, when in doubt, take a bigger hammer. Not a sophisticated high-precision low-tolerance tool. That tool works well (better than the hammer) when you already have no doubts, when you precisely understand how things are going to work.
You're criticizing the prioritization of cost, not the concept of trying to solve for constraints. Engineering is about constrained optimization to meet customer needs.[1] Learning this is a core part of the curriculum at my accredited engineering school.
> Engineering design is a process of making informed decisions to creatively devise products, systems, components, or processes to meet specified goals
based on engineering analysis and judgement. The process is often
characterized as complex, open-ended, iterative, and multidisciplinary.
Solutions incorporate natural sciences, mathematics, and engineering
science, using systematic and current best practices to satisfy defined
objectives within identified requirements, criteria and constraints.
> Constraints to be considered may include (but are not limited to): health and
safety, sustainability, environmental, ethical, security, economic, aesthetics
and human factors, feasibility and compliance with regulatory aspects, along
with universal design issues such as societal, cultural and diversification
facets.
It's not an MBA philosophy but is intrinsic to the profession. Apollo didn't go up because of vibes, it went up because engineers knew the goals going in and to figured out how much fuel was needed to go to the moon. It also went up because the United States was willing to spend over a quarter of a trillion dollars (adjusted for inflation) on getting there,[2] and ignored the arguments that it was a giant waste of money while there were social problems at home.[3]
This comment isn't directed at you jjmarr, I appreciate your take, but I think it's important to point out that,
> constrained optimization to meet customer needs
is MBA-capture in action.
For most of its existence as a formal field, engineering wasn't about making geegaws that "meet customer needs." It was about building stuff that matters. Houses that didn't collapse. Roads and machines that made it possible to traverse vast distances. Toys that delighted us. Aquaducts that delivered clean water. Drainage that helped remove muck. Plumbing that cleaned our cities. Threshers that helped us harvest crops. Lights that vanquished the dark.
The story of engineering is the story of creating technology that helps alleviate want.
You can say that there was a "customer" for each, which is great and all, but that's not why we did it. We did it so that we could move out of the caves and not be in filth and muck all the time.
We did it because it felt good. And we did it because it was the right thing to do.
I don't understand what you are objecting to. Is it just the phrasing that's bothering you? Because from my point of view, "houses that don't collapse" and "machines that can travel vast distances" are all formulations of customer needs. And dealing with contraints is pretty much engineering 101, every project is at the very least constrained on two of these axes: cost, construction time or material availability.
Not GP, but I think the objection is: the engineer wants to build a thing cheaply enough that it functions, and then cheaply as can be while maintaining function.
The MBA wants to build a thing as cheaply as can be while extracting maximum value from the process. Maintaining function is only relevant inasmuch as is necessary for marketing.
Enshittification is offensive to the engineer, and is a deliberate calculated tactic for the MBA.
We're replete with case studies, but my favorite is Kitchen-Aid mixers which accumulated a reputation when they were the small version of Hobart mixers, and have in succeeding decades become a cheap pile of crap because the optimization does not care about quality of function so long as the appearance of quality can be maintained. And it's cheaper to look quality than it is to be so.
A close second is Singer in the '70s, which for a while decided to ship items with 100-hour motors because "Folks don't usually spend much time _actually_ sewing". Contrast with the machines built a centuryish before. We've got an early electric model which is still doing fantastic precise work. The engineer would enthuse over the superb work that went into building such a tool, and the MBA would focus on the foregone sales, the value not extracted.
I was watching this documentary Happy People, about people who live in the Siberian Taiga (by Werner Herzog, would highly recommend). A man is talking about making a new set of skis, and it shows the incredibly long and careful process of selecting the perfect trees, chopping them down in the right way, treating the wood and so on. He mentions how mass manufactured skis are light and cheap and will work fine for a while, but when one breaks and you're in the Siberian wilderness you can't just go to the store for a replacement. That really stuck with me.
1960s US is hardly Siberia and I don't think any NASA engineers had their heads on the chopping block if their designs failed. But engineering philosophy was still rooted in survival; the primary goal was to make something that wouldn't kill you because it fails.
You hear stories about artisans in the old days refusing work because they don't believe what they're being asked to make is safe or reliable enough for the person asking for it. Maybe it's romanticized and idealized, maybe it's just them covering their ass so they don't get blamed. But that philosophy of personal responsibility not just for making things according to the constraints, but for the outcome too, is something that served society well for a long time before slowly disappearing over the past century or so.
It hasn't left without reason. As the things being made became less key to survival and more key to thrival, as the world became more interconnected and safe, it didn't make as much sense. Just think of how many crazy, inventive concepts we use every day wouldn't have been made if they could only be made to work reliably! Our entire modern existence is based off things that don't work reliably. It's a blessing and a curse.
But when we're exploring the final frontier we need frontier thinking and frontier technology; things that, from the ground up, are built to work first with all other constraints secondary. Unfortunately spaceflight endeavors today must invariably build off the 'good enough, when it breaks just make a new one' foundation that permeates modern design at every level. Even if you want to make something nowadays with the sole purpose of working, as long as you're using any technological advancements made in the past 50 years chances are you're using something that wasn't made with that goal in mind.
I think you are presenting a romanticized fictional narrative, especially when it comes to aerospace.
When engineers were working on Apollo and lunar landers, they were working on a set of customer requirements a mile long. Roving tinkerers didn't build the moon rockets. Engineers spent countless hours in design reviews with the customer, in this case, NASA.
Roman engineers didn't build aqueducts and colosseums on a lark, or some sense of poetic destiny.
> If you take the time to study the documentation from the 1950s & 1960s, the engineering culture of that era appears to be markedly different from the engineering culture prevalent today. And I think it's deeply rooted in the symbiotic relationship between computing, Baumol's cost disease and our obsession with precision, results-oriented, MBA-style-min-maxing, "good enough for government work" engineering.
I wonder how much of that is because of public attitudes to government spend. Like if a SpaceX rocket blows up, they're taking innovative, risk-taking approaches to rocket development. If a NASA rocket blows up they're wasting tax payer funding.
Similarly the pressure on NASA to have fewer programs for cost saving is similar. If NASA has two rocket programs, one of which is at a "good enough" level for launching satellites economically into space and one of them is a "safety conscious" rocket for manned launches at a higher per-mission cost, then people look at this and think why is NASA duplicating work and spending. So now they get only one program, so then even launching a GPS satellite is the expensive, human-safe rocket.
> China adopted the Surveyor / Apollo-era philosophy. Their first successful lander, Chang'e 3, used the same hover & fall technique as Surveyor.
Dropping the last 4 metres isn't a sign of having a ruggedized, over-speced "takes a lickin' and keeps on kicking' approach". In lunar gravity, you could drop a raw egg from that height and not perturb the chick inside.
Instead the aim is to avoid throwing up too much moon dust with retro rockets.
Luna 9 (1966) really did need to withstand a bit of a bump, but it was 22km/h, comparable with a fast running pace or a car in first gear, not a high speed impact.
> Dropping the last 4 metres isn't a sign of having a ruggedized, over-speced "takes a lickin' and keeps on kicking' approach". In lunar gravity, you could drop a raw egg from that height and not perturb the chick inside.
Just for maximum pedantry:
Falling 4 m on the moon is like falling 66 cm or about 2 feet on earth. I don’t know about your eggs but the ones I know wouldn’t survive that.
It is all downstream of the loss of the manufacturing industry in America. In the 50s you could entrust a random guy to build a liquid rocket engine in a dusty garage because he spent every day of his career building various pipes and combustion chambers. All of these guys are now dead or retired so when you try to build hardware today you get new grads who settle on LIDAR and computer vision not because it is the best choice but because it is literally all that they are familiar with; the old solutions have all ceased to exist within the minds of employees and classrooms.
This reads like a “comment” version of Destin’s speech to a NASA group a few years ago [0]. The loss of institutional knowledge and fundamentals philosophical differences seem like they’ll need to be overcome.
The talk was to the American Astronautical Society, not specifically a NASA group. But Destin talked as though he imagined everyone in the audience worked at NASA. It actually bothered me a bit - if I had been at that talk I would have been a bit pissed off, because he was basically using it as a channel to talk to people who probably weren't actually even there.
Was it? I read it as a pretty hyped up version of "old space guy says to old space people that they're not old spacing enough, presents it as rebellion". In particular (and, to be clear, it's been a while) he kept going "why not do it like apollo" when the entire point is that it isn't Apollo anymore.
Though, again, it's been a while since I watched it.
He wasn't just saying 'do it like Apollo did' in terms of tech, but rather focusing on the process. I think the key takeaway is that one of the main things they did during Apollo was to obsessively try to get everybody to express their honest feedback, and especially negative feedback. Artemis isn't ever going anywhere for a million reasons, of which he listed a couple of random ones, but everybody keeps pretending it is.
That's because the powers that be surround themselves with yes-men or (equivalently) people are afraid of the consequences for stating their honest opinion, when that opinion is negative. It's a problem as old as time. "The Emperor's New Clothes" is based on tales dating back to around 1000AD, and I'm sure it goes back far further than that. This problem destroys competence, destroys countries, and has become ubiquitous in every single aspect of high level public (and to a lesser degree even high level private) decision making in the US.
Notice how things seem to constantly just go wrong in spite of effectively endless resources and manpower? If you look at what we have today in terms of any quantifiable metric we should be able to run circles around the 60s (in terms of, amongst other things, tech advancement) with our eyes shut, yet in practice we're struggling to recreate what they did in the 60s, in 7 years, starting from nothing and on a [relatively] extremely limited budget.
> Perhaps it is to save on mass and power so that more payload reaches the surface.
It doesn't matter how much mass was saved and how much more payload that allowed to reach the surface if the landing isn't successful. Successful landing is mandatory for anything else to matter. The obviousness of this baffles me that it is taken so haphazardly.
I believe that the thing you are missing is Intuitive Machines aims at landing a lot of spacecrafts, not just one. They hope to have a limited number of failures to land which will teach them how to do it reliably. We might doubt will this work or not, but if we accept the plan then it becomes a rational decision to increase the engineering complexity and risks of failure by saving on mass, because in the long run less missions will allow to land more payload.
Though, of course, I wonder how many landings they are planning to do, and how many of them they need to do to compensate for each failure to land.
Again, if you can't stick the landing, you might as well not have any payload on it. So if you're worried about cost, keep testing until you can stick the landing with dummy mass. Once that works, send the real payload. Otherwise, you're just wasting payload.
The mindset difference seems to be that if there's no human on board, so no problemo wasting a lander if something goes wrong. That's just a bad attitude (as well as yaw and roll). If you designed everything with "baby on board" hanging in the window, you'd probably not cut so many corners so sharply. Otherwise, why not just light your cigars with hundred dollar bills. How would you feel if you were on the team building the payload, but the lander guys keep fucking up so you just wasted however much time you spent because "meh, we're just testing". In sports, there's a saying "practice like you play because you play like you practice".
Who said it was easy? I'm saying they are not giving it enough respect because of the attitude of "it's only a test". That's bad. It's still expensive to get to that point. They have become complacent/lazy with the luxury of being able to iterate. Rather than spending money on engineering testing, they just build "real things" that don't work and improve the failed things. Never mind that if procedure 10 failed, you never get to test procedure 11+. So your next launch fails at procedure 11. It's just a bad attitude.
If you look at Change 5 and 6, they seem to do the same image processing based landing control. This doesn't seem to be a cost cutting measure, since the image processing is computationally much more complex than using a radar altimeter.
Robert Truax, the designer of the Sea Dragon, loved to promote the design paradigm of Big Dumb Boosters. Instead of many small, sophisticated rocket engines, what if we made one big robust one that can take a lickin' and keep on kickin'.
The idea was to relax the mass margins and to create big. dumb. boosters. It's the approach TRW explicitly followed for the Lunar Module engine,
The Surveyor program managed to make it "just work" 5 out of 7 times by adopting this approach. It had robust landing legs and RADAR. They would decelerate and then shut off the engine 11' above the surface. The wide, sturdy legs would then absorb that final impact of coming stand still from free fall.These programs had a lot of capital behind them. Some components required precision engineering, but there's a very clear through line and embrace of the "we gotta make stuff that can take a lickin' & keeps kickin'" philosophy.
Modern engineering approaches seem to be the opposite of that. I think we've become so accustomed to living in a silicon driven world where our personal devices are engineered at microscopic level that we've forgotten how to do things the Apollo-era way.
For example, to the best of my knowledge, IM-2 doesn't use RADAR — they're using LIDAR and optical navigation instead. Perhaps it is to save on mass and power so that more payload reaches the surface. Perhaps optical navigation was declared to be "good enough." Perhaps it doesn't make sense from a minmaxing of capital perspective. But this philosophy may not be suited to an untamed frontier.
China adopted the Surveyor / Apollo-era philosophy. Their first successful lander, Chang'e 3, used the same hover & fall technique as Surveyor.
It chose the terminal landing sites with the help of LIDAR and its cameras, but it relied on RADAR and a suite of sensors to have robust navigation.The follow up missions up-ed the ante every time, but they seem to have consistently focused on the robustness of their craft over precision, MBA-spreadsheet-oriented minmax-ing.