> If you take the time to study the documentation from the 1950s & 1960s, the engineering culture of that era appears to be markedly different from the engineering culture prevalent today. And I think it's deeply rooted in the symbiotic relationship between computing, Baumol's cost disease and our obsession with precision, results-oriented, MBA-style-min-maxing, "good enough for government work" engineering.
I wonder how much of that is because of public attitudes to government spend. Like if a SpaceX rocket blows up, they're taking innovative, risk-taking approaches to rocket development. If a NASA rocket blows up they're wasting tax payer funding.
Similarly the pressure on NASA to have fewer programs for cost saving is similar. If NASA has two rocket programs, one of which is at a "good enough" level for launching satellites economically into space and one of them is a "safety conscious" rocket for manned launches at a higher per-mission cost, then people look at this and think why is NASA duplicating work and spending. So now they get only one program, so then even launching a GPS satellite is the expensive, human-safe rocket.
I wonder how much of that is because of public attitudes to government spend. Like if a SpaceX rocket blows up, they're taking innovative, risk-taking approaches to rocket development. If a NASA rocket blows up they're wasting tax payer funding.
Similarly the pressure on NASA to have fewer programs for cost saving is similar. If NASA has two rocket programs, one of which is at a "good enough" level for launching satellites economically into space and one of them is a "safety conscious" rocket for manned launches at a higher per-mission cost, then people look at this and think why is NASA duplicating work and spending. So now they get only one program, so then even launching a GPS satellite is the expensive, human-safe rocket.