[330] before the battle of Manassas, that as nearly as he could remember it was as follows, viz.:
One four-horse wagon to each company. One four-horse wagon for field and staff (regimental). One four-horse wagon for ammunition. One four-horse wagon for hospital purposes. Two four-horse wagons for each battery of artillery. Twenty-five wagons in a train for depot purposes. One ambulance for each regiment.Transportation belonging to General Johnston's army did not arrive until the day (or probably two days) after the battle. If General Johnston, as stated, had nine thousand infantry, the field transportation reported above could surely have been distributed so as to supply this additional force, and have rendered, as General Early states, the pretense wholly untenable that the advance in July, 1861, was prevented by want of transportation. The deep anxiety which had existed, and was justified by the circumstances, had corresponding gratification among all classes and in all sections of our country. On the day after the victory, the Congress, then sitting in Richmond, upon receiving the dispatch of the President from the field of Manassas, adopted resolutions expressive of their thanks to the most high God, and inviting the people of the Confederate States to offer up their united thanksgiving and praise for the mighty deliverance. The resolutions also deplored the necessity which had caused the soil of our country to be stained with the blood of its sons, and to their families and friends offered the most cordial sympathy; assuring them that in the hearts of our people would be enshrined “the names of the gallant dead as the champions of free and constitutional liberty.” If universal gratulation at our success inspired an overweening confidence, it also begat increased desire to enter the military service; but for our want of arms and munitions, we could have enrolled an army little short of the number of able-bodied men in the Confederate States. I have given so much space to the battle of Manassas because it was the first great action of the war, exciting intense feeling, and producing important moral results among the people of the Confederacy; further, because it was made the basis of misrepresentation, and unjust reflection upon the chief executive, which certainly had no plausible pretext in the facts, and cannot be referred to a reasonable desire to promote the successful defense of our country. Impressed with the conviction that time would naturally work to
