[
439]
My answer has grown to such a length, that I must confine myself to one more quotation from your letter.
You proceed: “Congress shall have power to
raise armies. How shall it be done?
The answer is clear.
In conformity to the provisions of the
Constitution, which expressly provides that, when the militia of the States are called forth to
repel invasion, and employed in the service of the
Confederate States, which is now the case, the
State shall appoint the officers.”
I beg you to observe that the answer which you say is clear is not an answer to the question put. The question is, How are armies to be raised?
The answer given is, that, when militia are called upon to repel invasion, the
State shall appoint the officers.
There seems to me to be a conclusive test on this whole subject.
By our Constitution, Congress may declare war,
offensive as well as
defensive. It may acquire territory.
Now, suppose that, for good cause and to right unprovoked injuries, Congress should declare war against
Mexico and invade
Sonora.
The militia could not be called forth in such a case, the right to call it being limited “to repel invasions.”
Is it not plain that the law now under discussion, if passed under such circumstances, could by no possibility be aught else than a law to “raise an army”?
Can one and the same law be construed into a “calling forth the militia,” if the war be defensive, and a “raising of armies,” if the war be offensive?
At some future day, after our independence shall have been established, it is no improbable supposition that our present enemy may be tempted to abuse his naval power by depredations on our commerce, and that we may be compelled to assert our rights by offensive war. How is it to be carried on?
Of what is the army to be composed?
If this Government can not call on its arms-bearing population otherwise than as militia, and if the militia can only be called forth to repel invasion, we should be utterly helpless to vindicate our honor or protect our rights.
War has been well styled “the terrible litigation of nations.”
Have we so formed our Government that in this litigation we must never be plaintiffs?
Surely this can not have been the intention of the framers of our compact.
In no respect in which I can view this law can I find just reason to distrust the propriety of my action in approving and signing it; and the question presented involves consequences, both immediate and remote, too momentous to permit me to leave your objections unanswered.
