‘I have always accorded to General Johnston due credit for boldness in his attack on our exposed flank at Bentonville; but I think he understates his strength, and doubt whether at the time he had accurate returns from his miscellaneous army, collected from Hoke, Bragg, Hardee, Lee, etc.’This last expression of opinion was evidently given in extenuation of the failure of the Federals to withstand the attack made by the much inferior force opposed to them; for, further on, General Sherman also says:2 ‘With the knowledge now possessed of his small force, of course I committed an error in not overwhelming Johnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865.’ Without attempting to discuss what General Sherman could or could not have done, had he known the real weakness of the Confederate troops in his front, we merely add that they were even weaker than he supposed them to be, for neither General S. D. Lee's forces, nor General Cheatham's, nor even Generals Wheeler's and Butler's cavalry, were with General Johnston at the time. General Hardee was hurriedly marched to Bentonville, and, as
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by a fourth of their numbers, with a loss so utterly insignificant,’ then ‘General Sherman's army had been demoralized.’1
General Hardee, now fearing an attempt to turn his left, and knowing his incapacity to resist the odds against him, fell back, in the night, towards Smithfield.
On the day of this occurrence, and with a view to avoid all misunderstanding among subordinate commanders, General Beauregard was officially announced as second in command to General Johnston.
The latter's telegrams to General Beauregard, dated March 20th, 21st, and 23d, speak of the encounter with the enemy at Bentonville, and give the various incidents of that fight—the last of the war, in the east—and one which was much to the honor of the Confederates.
Taking advantage of the fact that General Sherman's left wing was at some distance from the right, General Johnston, on the morning of the 19th, determined to strike a blow while he had the chance to do so. Of that determination, and of the manner in which it was carried out, General Sherman says:
1 Johnston's ‘Narrative of Military Operations,’ p. 383.
2 General Sherman's ‘Memoirs,’ vol. II., p. 306.
1883. Harper. New York.
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