Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865

[665] not be worth while to go into any military discussion before information was received of the condition of General Lee's army.

We were summoned to the President's office in an hour or two, finding Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan with him. We supposed that we were to be questioned upon the military resources of our Department. The President's object seemed to be, however, to give—not to obtain—information; for, addressing the party, he explained to us how, in a few weeks (he said two or three), he would raise a large army by bringing back into the ranks those who had abandoned their regiments, and by calling out the enrolled men that the officers of the Conscript Bureau had been unable to bring into the military service. It was remarked by me, and supported by you, that men who had left the army when our cause was not desperate, and those who, under the same circumstances, could not be forced into it by the agents of the Conscript Bureau, would scarcely, in our present condition, enter the service upon mere invitation. No other subject was introduced.

General Breckinridge arrived that evening (12th), and confirmed the reports of General Lee's surrender, which had been spread through the country by fugitives from his army. We then reviewed the state of affairs, and agreed in the opinion that the Confederacy was overthrown; that, practically, we had no longer a Government, because Mr. Davis and his Cabinet had lost all the attributes of one: having no control over the people, no money, nor credit, nor basis of credit, nor army, nor ammunition, nor means for obtaining them. They could not, therefore, support the little army then existing. Under these circumstances we regarded it as criminal to continue the war, and thought that the only function of Government left the President should be exercised at once —that of making peace.

In consultation with General Breckinridge next morning (13th) I expressed to him these views of ours, and, believing that none of his Cabinet would do it, offered to suggest to the President to act upon them. General Breckinridge promised to endeavor to make the opportunity for me. I also conversed with Mr. Mallory on the same subject afterwards, and he appeared to be anxious that negotiations should be proposed.

We were summoned to the President's office the same morning (13th), an hour or two after the meeting of his Cabinet. There I, as oldest, speaking first—you sustaining me—we compared the military forces: ours about 17,000, infantry and artillery, and 4000 cavalry; that of the enemy about 180,000 men, under Grant, about 110,000 under Sherman, and about 60,000 under Canby. We, without the means of purchasing supplies of any kind, or procuring or repairing arms, could continue the war only as robbers or guerillas. Under such circumstances it was represented that it would be the greatest of human crimes on our part to continue the war, and therefore the opening of negotiations was suggested. The members of the Cabinet present were then invited to express their opinions. All, except Mr. Benjamin and Mr. Davis, agreed with us. He (Mr. B.) repeated something very like Sempronius's speech for war. Mr. Davis received these suggestions of mine as if annoyed by them. He said that it was idle to propose that he should attempt to negotiate, when it was certain, from