Col. J. Stoddard Johnston, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 9.1, Kentucky
Clement Anselm Evans, Ed.

[137] corps was covered by that upon the left, veiling their advance from the ordinary means of observation or communication. General Buell's movement had in fact been made with a promptitude which took Bragg by surprise, and with a judgment which could not have been excelled, for neither of which he received proper credit at the hands of his government. Acting under this misconception of the true situation, General Bragg instructed General Polk to move all his available force via Bloomfield to Frankfort, to strike the enemy, which would have been but one division, in the flank. It was an order from the nature of the roads impractical to execute and, considering the actual situation, altogether unwise. General Polk received the order at Bardstown on the 3rd, but consulting his corps and division commanders, in view of his better information as to Buell's real movements, fell back upon Perryville.

Had General Bragg then, treating Sill's movement as secondary, concentrated his army at Perryville, the history of this campaign thence forward might have been different. He had, however, countermanded his order before he heard from General Polk, and on the 4th, upon the approach of Sill's cavalry, retreated from Frankfort to Versailles. The effect of the sound of the Federal artillery was similar to that of the artillery of Waterloo upon the gay throng at Brussels. The capital was full, not only of soldiers, but of civilians who had come to witness the gubernatorial inauguration and to attend a grad ball that night, the beauty of the Blue Grass having come to grace the occasion. The movement to Versailles began at 4 o'clock p. m. without preliminary warning.

And there were sudden partings, such as press
     The life from out young hearts, and choking sighs
Which ne'er might be repeated; who could guess
     If ever more should meet those mutual eyes.