Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 4.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

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[284] astonishment when he found himself upon an isolated ridge composed of two large peaks and separated by a deep valley from the true chain, before which is thrown, like a mask, this small parallel chain of equal elevation. It was only from Fort Wood to Chattanooga that one might have perceived the valley which divides these two chains of mountains; but its windings concealed the bottom, and led the beholder at a distance to believe that the valley was shut in by the principal crest. The heights rising before Sherman are crowned with the enemy, who, firmly planted, await him at the top of slopes the elevation of which, owing to a prevailing fog, appears greater than it actually is. Bragg, uneasy, as we have stated, on account of Howard's demonstrations, has made up his mind to extend his right beyond the fortified positions which it has held for a long time. Hardee, uniting Walker's division to Cleburne's, has planted himself on Missionary Ridge beyond the gap which divides the chain south of the tunnel. He has hastily fortified three main knobs, one of them being between the gap and the tunnel; the two others more to the northward, in front of the knob upon which Sherman has just made his appearance. It is upon these last two knobs that he has gathered his forces, for he has been informed since the morning of the movements of the Fifteenth corps; and if he did not interrupt these movements it was because he did not wish to go away from the rest of the army, and preferred to fight upon chosen ground of which he knew the advantage.

One glance from Sherman and his lieutenants has sufficed to take the measure of the error they have committed. The heights which they have just seized give them no access to Missionary Ridge, and afford them no advantage to attack it. At the moment when they thought to pluck the fruits of a complete surprise they find the enemy on his guard. Instead of holding the key to these formidable positions, which it was their object to take by the rear, they shall be obliged to engage them in front.

Shall they avail themselves of the last flushes of sunset to try and carry these positions ere the enemy shall have received fresh reinforcements and completed his defences? Their judgment inclines them to do so, but the lateness of the hour allows time neither to reconnoitre the ground nor to prepare the attack. The