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[493] Having determined to advance upon Richmond by an overland march, it depended on General Grant's own will to give his operations what character he pleased. This, at least, was true after the battle of the Wilderness, which was an inevitable action, determined less by strategic or tactical considerations than by the moral condition of the opposing armies and their commanders. Whatever was done after that should have been done to accomplish the ultimate result aimed at. This, however, was of a double nature—to destroy Lee's army, and to capture Richmond, covered by that army. The latter could only be effected by a carefully considered combination and direction of force. When the hostile army had succeeded in ensconcing itself within such intrenched lines as those of Spottsylvania, the North Anna, and the Chickahominy, the chances of dealing an effective blow were meagre indeed; while assaults, under such circumstances, were attended with a sacrifice of life enormous on the part of the assailants, and slight on the part of the defenders. The only possible result to be gained by such attacks was, therefore, the forcing of the enemy from his position. But this might have been done without loss by a simple turning movement, and the principles of war admonish the use of this means in preference to an attack in front, in every case where, by this means, a position may be carried.1 Moreover, this was the means by which, eventually, after a heavy waste of life, the enemy was dislodged from these lines. It results that such assaults were vain; and the campaign on the
1 This principle in military art is too well established to require that it should be fortified by authority; but Napoleon, in a criticism on the conduct of Turenne in the campaign of 1655, sets forth the action of that general in a statement of principles so different from those followed by General Grant, that I cannot avoid citing it here. ‘Turenne,’ says he, ‘constantly observed the two maxims: 1st, Never attack a position in front, when you can obtain it by turning it; 2d, Avoid doing what the enemy wishes, and that simply because he does wish it. Shun the field of battle which he has reconnoitred and stud ied, and more particularly that in which he has fortified and intrenched himself.’—Montholon and Gourgaud: Memoirs of Napoleon, vol. III., p. 95.
1866.
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