This text is part of:
1 To correct this absence a stringent system of military police was at once adopted, and this measure was followed by an immediate improvement in the morale of the troops. The root of the evil, however, lay deeper—lay in the really vicious system governing the primary organization of regiments and the appointment of their officers.2 Though General McClellan was unable to strike at this, he endeavored, as far as might be, to remedy its results; and Congress having passed a bill authorizing the President to dispense with the services of inefficient officers, the Army of the Potomac was soon weeded of several hundred worthless wearers of shoulder-straps.3 The problem of the best organization to be given a newly formed army, is one that to this day has received no final solution; and whatever principle be adopted, the original organization will be apt to require modification very soon after entering upon a campaign. The divisions, composed of two or more brigades, is, however, a permanent unit: and General McClellan, after the regiments had been
2 Prince de Joinville: The Army of the Potomac, p. 17; Lecomte: Guerre des Etats-Unis, p. 55.
In just views regarding this, as regarding most other matters relating to the war, the people were much in advance of the Government; and one of the most curious instances of this is a formal memorial at this time addressed to the President by ‘property holders of New York,’ regarding the system of officering regiments. This paper, marked by the soundest good sense, was published in the New York journals of August 1, 1861. ‘They complain,’ says the memorial, ‘that a suitable supervision has not been extended by Government to the officering of the volunteer forces; that the principle of allowing companies to choose their own officers, or officers their own colonels, is fatal to military discipline: that political, local, and personal interests have had far too much sway in the selection of officers; that undue laxity prevails in the control of volunteer officers by their military superiors; and that an ill-grounded apprehension of local or political censure has prevented the proper authorities from removing incompetent commanders, and from placing in responsible military positions those most capable of filling them, without regard to any thing but their qualifications,’ etc., etc.3 After the institution of the qualifying examination, three hundred and ten cers were dismissed, or their resignations accepted, within eight months.
1866.
Tufts University provided support for entering this text.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.