William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac

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[315] of a hundred miles: for his right (Hill's corps) still held the lines of Fredericksburg; his centre (Longstreet's corps) lay at Culpepper; and his left (Ewell's corps) was at the mouth of the Shenandoah Valley!

Now, it will doubtless not be difficult for any one capable of looking at the map of Northern Virginia with a military eye, to base on these data a plan of action which it may be supposed would be the plan of action suited to the circumstances. But it would be altogether unjust to judge what General Hooker did, or what he failed to do, by the simple results of military reasoning; for in the relations which he held to the central military authority at Washington—an authority to which his own views were completely subordinated—he had neither the freedom of willing nor of acting.

It would appear obvious that in the dangerous positioning of Lee's army (and this very boldness would seem to imply a great contempt for his opponent), the proper place for Hooker to strike was at that exposed rear of his long line formed by Hill's corps; for it is as sure an inference as any inference in war can be, that a force, of, say, two or three corps, thrown across the Rappahannock at Banks' or United States ford, could interpose itself between Hill (at Fredericksburg) and Longstreet (at Culpepper). And if the movement did not insure Hill's destruction (which it ought to do, in vigorous hands), his jeopardized situation would certainly recall Lee's other forces to his support. This interruption of the plan of invasion would be its ending.

It is an interesting fact that precisely this method of action was suggested by General Hooker a short time before he became aware of Lee's actual movement,¹ and authority for its execution was asked in case the Confederate force should move northward.² To this most judicious suggestion two replies, or rather two forms of the same reply—for the opinion was Halleck's—were returned. The one was from the President,