George Bancroft, History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent, Vol. 2, 17th edition.

[13] between the Presbyterians and Independents.

Chap XI.}

The former party had its organ in the parliament, the latter in the army, in which the Presbyterian commander had been surprised into a resignation by the self-denying ordinance, and the intrigues of Cromwell. As the duration of the parliament was unlimited, the Army refused to be disbanded; claiming to represent the interests of the people, and actually constituting the only balance to the otherwise unlimited power of the parliament. The army could call the parliament a usurper, and the parliament could arraign the army as a branch of the public service, whose duty was obedience, and not counsel. On the other hand, if the parliament pleaded its office as the grand council of the nation, the army could urge its merits as the active and successful antagonist to royal despotism.

The new crisis was inevitable. The Presbyterians

1647

broke forth into menaces against the army. ‘These men,’ whispered Cromwell to Ludlow, ‘will never leave till the army pull them out by the ears.’¹ The Presbyterian majority was in a false position; it appeared to possess paramount power, and did not actually possess it. Could they gain the person of the king, and succeed in pacific negotiations, their influence would be renewed by the natural love of order in the minds of the English people. A collision with the Independents was unavoidable; for the Independents could in no event negotiate with the king. In every negotiation a free parliament must have been a condition; and a free parliament would have been their doom. Self-preservation, uniting with ambition and wild enthusiasm, urged them to uncompromising hostility with Charles I. He or they must perish. ‘If ’