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could defend himself, but the suggestion was not adopted by Miles, who felt himself obliged by his orders to hold the village itself.
As Lee could not advance freely into Pennsylvania with Miles's force so close in his rear, he determined to capture the Harper's Ferry garrison.
Discussing the matter with Longstreet, the latter advised against it, saying that it would require a wide separation of our divisions, with rivers between them, which would be dangerous so near the enemy.
Lee, however, believed that it was possible to capture Harper's Ferry and reunite his army before McClellan could fully apprehend his plans.
As Jackson took the same view, the enterprise was committed to him, and a carefully drawn order was prepared, ‘No. 191,’ detailing the march of each division.
Jackson, with his corps (except D. H. Hill's division) was ordered via Williamsport to drive the Federals from Martinsburg into Harper's Ferry, which he would then attack from the south.
Walker's division was to cross the Potomac below Harper's Ferry and occupy Loudon Heights.
McLaws, with his own and Anderson's divisions, was to move by the most direct route and possess himself of Maryland Heights, overlooking Harper's Ferry, whence he could with artillery, and even with musketry, command the town.
Longstreet, with the two divisions of D. R. Jones and Evans, was to march to Boonsboro and await the return of the forces from Harper's Ferry.
Finally, D. H. Hill's division was to act as rear-guard at Turner's Gap in South Mountain.
On Sept. 10, the army marched at daylight.
On the road Longstreet was ordered to continue his movement to Hagerstown, while D. H. Hill, leaving two brigades in Turner's Gap, came on to Boonsboro.
This change was caused by the collection of a force of Pennsylvania militia at Chambersburg.
It was not formidable, as the regiments refused to leave the State, yet its formation materially affected the course of events.
For it will be seen that this separation of Longstreet by 13 miles from D. H. Hill, caused the loss of the position at Turner's Gap.
The loss of that gap brought on at Sharpsburg the battle which would otherwise have probably been fought upon the mountain.
Meanwhile, there had occurred the mishap already referred to, which gave to McClellan an opportunity rarely presented to a
1907.
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