Edward Porter Alexander, Military memoirs of a Confederate: a critical narrative

[466] attack all day, but none was made. Longstreet reports that he advised crossing the Tennessee River and moving upon Rosecrans's communications, and that Bragg approved and ordered Polk's wing to take the lead, while his wing cared for the wounded and policed the field. The army, however, was in such confusion and need of ammunition that it was dark before the rear of Polk's corps was stretched out upon the road, and Longstreet's march was postponed until the 22d. During the night Thomas withdrew into the city, which was already partially fortified, and was now easily made impregnable.

Bragg followed on the 22d and took position in front of him, Longstreet's scheme of moving across the Tennessee River on Rosecrans's communications he deemed impracticable and dropped it. The town was not invested closely, but position was taken on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, about three miles out, with the intention of compelling the evacuation of Chattanooga by cutting it off from its base of supplies at Stevenson, Ala.

The shortest and best road came via Jasper, crossed the river at Kelley's Ferry, and, recrossing at Brown's Ferry, found itself directly opposite Chattanooga on the north side of the river, about 40 miles from Stevenson. But this road could not be used. Below Kelley's Ferry it skirted the river and was commanded by small-arms from the south side. This compelled the enemy to cross Walden's Ridge to get by, adding many miles to their journey over exceedingly rough country.

The importance of holding strongly the country between the two ferries, Kelley's and Browns's, seems never to have been appreciated by either Bragg or Longstreet, who had charge of the left wing of the army. The duty was confided to a single small brigade, Law's, of Hood's division, which was sent around the toe of Lookout Mountain for the purpose. A full division at least should have guarded so important a point, and one so exposed.¹