‘Each brigade commander received positive instructions which were well understood. The whole line was to push ahead from the beginning, keeping the road for its guide. . . . Under no circumstances was there to be any pause in the advance.’Ramseur's brigade was ordered to move in rear of Colquitt's and to support it. Colquitt, early in the advance, halted to investigate a rumor of a body of the enemy on his right flank, which proved to be a small party of cavalry. He delayed so that neither his brigade or Ramseur's rejoined the line until late at night. Thus two brigades, by disregard of instructions and without need, were kept entirely out of action during the whole afternoon. So it happened that five of Jackson's 15 brigades (Thomas, Archer, Paxton, Colquitt and Ramseur) were missing from his line of battle during the whole afternoon, and, as A. P. Hill's four remaining brigades were not deployed until after dark, only six brigades were in the attack and pursuit of the 11th corps: to wit, Rodes, Doles, and Iverson of Rodes's division, and Jones, Warren, and Nichols of Colston's division. The great advantage of the Confederates lay in their being able to bring the centre of their line of battle against the flank of the enemy's line. This overwhelmed the two right brigades in a very short while, as we have seen, and the line pushed rapidly on, hoping to overwhelm the succeeding brigades likewise, one at a time. The next division was Schurz's of two brigades, in line of battle along the Plank road, with two batteries which took positions and fired on the approaching Confederates. Schurz endeavored to
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ground was favorable, stopping only to fire at fugitives, or when completely out of breath.
The horse artillery kept nearly abreast, and directed its fire principally at the Federal batteries which endeavored to cover the retreat.
Some of these were fought gallantly, and some were overrun and captured.
More might have been, and more prisoners taken, but for a blunder by Colquitt.
His brigade was on the right of the front line, and its advance was least obstructed either by woods or the enemy.
It could have moved most rapidly, and might have narrowed the enemy's avenue of escape.
Jackson's instructions had been explicit.
Rodes's report says:—
1907.
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