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Of the artillery fighting on the right flank,
Gen. Armistead reported: —
‘By a reconnoissance first made by Col. E. C. Edmonds of the 38th Va. . . . I found that the enemy were in, near, and around Crew's house, and that the hill in front of the ravine we occupied was a good position for artillery.
It was asked for, and Capt. Pegram's and Grimes's batteries were sent.
The fire was a terrible one and the men stood it well.
The enemy must have had 30 or 40 pieces opposed to ours and of superior calibre.
No men could have behaved better than Capts. Pegram and Grimes.
They worked their guns after their men were cut down, and only retired when entirely disabled.
I sent for more artillery repeatedly.’
These extracts sufficiently illustrate the character of the fighting during the hours devoted in theory to bringing a heavy enfilading and cross-fire of artillery to bear upon the enemy in his crowded position.
The one advantage which we had was that all our shots were converging toward his centre, and stood fair chances of finding some of his troops, even when they missed their special targets.
And, thin, scattered, and meagre as our artillery fire was,—‘almost farcical,’ as
D. H. Hill pronounced it, and directed entirely at the enemy's batteries, its effect upon his infantry lines was such that
Sumner withdrew his whole corps from their positions, and took refuge under the crest of the hills nearest the river, and he ordered
Porter also to withdraw.
Porter reports that he—
‘protested against such a movement as disastrous to us, adding that as the major-general commanding had seen and approved my disposition, and also Gen. Couch's, I could not change without his order, which could soon be obtained if desirable.
He desisted and the enemy was soon upon us, compelling him to recall his own corps.’
How eloquent is this episode of what might have been the effect of bold and energetic use, early in the day, not only of our large artillery reserve, but of all our brigade and division batteries, brought in under their protection, as might have been done under efficient management.
As it was, this inefficient artillery service so discouraged the prospects of an assault that before three o'clock
Lee abandoned his intention to assault.
Longstreet was informed,
1 but no
