Adam Badeau, Grant in peace: from Appomattox to Mount McGregor, a personal memoir

[88] the law was passed, against the protestations and over the veto of the President, prohibiting him, without the approval of the Senate, from removing officers whose confirmation required the Senate's approval. The rule was extended, with certain restrictions, to members of the Cabinet; and the President was not allowed to dismiss a Minister until the end of his term. He was at liberty, however, during the recess of Congress, to suspend any officer for cause, but must report the case to the Senate when it re-assembled. If, then, the Senate concurred, the officer was dismissed; if not, he was restored. This law, it was matter of notoriety, had especial reference to the Secretary of War. It was passed in March, and Congress adjourned on the 20th of July.

Eleven days afterward, Mr. Johnson sent for Grant and informed him that he intended to suspend Stanton, and at the same time remove Sheridan from New Orleans. He also stated that he meant to appoint Grant himself Secretary of War ad interim. There could be no possible doubt of the purpose of this move. It was intended to nullify as far as possible the action of Congress, to punish men for striving to execute the law, to hinder the Reconstruction policy. Johnson could hardly have hoped to accomplish much by putting Grant in Stanton's place. Still the soldier was less unbending in manner than the Secretary, less uncompromising in the appearance of hostility; and his military habit of subordination may even yet have misled the President. He certainly was less skilled in the arts of political chicanery, and Johnson may have thought it possible still to inveigle or overreach him. But the especial object doubtless was, not so much to manage Grant as to affect the people, to produce the impression on the country that Grant was in accord with the Administration, and that by entering the Cabinet at this crisis he was offering proof of his sympathy with the President.